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Abstract: This paper exploits a unique panel of 59,000 French firms over 1990-2004 to
investigate the interactions between R&D, advertising and the competitive environment.
The empirical findings confirm the predictions of a dynamic model that complements
results known in static frameworks. First, more competition pushes Neck and Neck firms
to advertise more to attract a larger share of consumers on their products or services.
Second, for a given competitive environment, quality leaders spend more in advertising in
order to extract maximal rents; thus, lower costs of ads may favor R&D.
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1 Introduction
In developed countries, both R&D and advertising expenditures are massive, e.g. above
2% of the GDP in the US. They are two key engines for firms to escape competition
through a quality advantage or a better attraction power toward consumers. This paper
exploits a large panel dataset of French firms to investigate the joint decision for R&D
and advertising efforts of firms according to the competitive environment. The empirics
support the predictions of an original theoretical model.
This issue is related to distinct literatures that analyze the relations between compe-
tition and, on the one hand R&D, or on the other hand, advertising, and the connections
between advertising and R&D :
Though in-depth firm-level empirical investigations are relatively scarce, it seems well
established that a more competitive environment induces firms to advertise more (see
Bagwell 2005 for a review). Advertising enables to acquire a reputation or to publicize
a better quality, intensity in innovation or even fashionableness of products or services.
Firms use advertising to deter and accommodate entry and induce exit (Doraszelski and
Markovich, 2007). Advertising seems to have clear positive consequences on firms’ revenues
or profits.
Aghion et al. (2005) summarize, in a unified framework, classic arguments of the
controversy Schumpeter versus Arrow. They show an ”escape competition” effect of R&D,
whereby competition exerts pressure on firms to spend in R&D in order to strengthen their
technological and market position. But when it is too harsh, it challenges incentives to
innovate.
The interplay between R&D and advertising is more ambiguous. If the returns asso-
ciated to advertising are higher than returns on R&D, favoring advertising may induce a
substitution and thus a reduction of the R&D effort. This mechanism should be strength-
ened when firms face credit constraints or have to compel with short-run objectives. But,
advertising and R&D may be complements. Advertising should be associated with im-
proving quality, since a famous firm is reluctant to lose its reputation by offering an odd or
outdated product (Fogg-Meade 1901). The Milgrom and Roberts (1986) model of adver-
tising as a signaling tool shows that higher quality firms advertise more. Advertising may
be more efficient if the firm proposes innovative or less costly goods or services (Nelson
1974, Fluet and Garella 2002). New opportunities of advertising may help to improve the
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information of consumers on the true quality of firms output, favouring ex ante incentives
to improve quality. Advertising may also generate short-term rents that help to finance
long-run investments including through R&D. These arguments provide explanations for
the high advertising spending in some R&D intensive sectors, like drugs (Matraves, 1999).
In addition, Grossmann (2008) argues that advertising also increases sunk costs and makes
entry more difficult. This in turn induces higher market concentrations with larger firms
and enhances R&D investments of insider firms-since R&D is more profitable to large
firms that are able to spread R&D costs over higher sales-. However, we can reverse the
argument: if incumbents are more innovative firms, barriers generated by advertising may
reduce the global R&D effort.
Our paper extends these strands of literature: we build a model that encompasses both
the static and dynamic interactions between R&D, advertising and competitive environ-
ment. The model is composed of two blocks. The static one replicates standard results
and is then plugged into a dynamic environment. In a given sector, we consider two firms
that compete on a market composed of a continuum of consumers. Two shares of the
latter have a preference for the product from each firm. The lower these shares, the lower
the differentiation, the higher the proportion of undecided consumers and then the larger
the room for price competition between the duopolists. The two firms could use costly
advertising to convince undecided consumers. The sector is either leveled - both firms are
technologically Neck-and-Neck and thus have a similar quality level (and production costs)
- or unleveled - one firm being a quality leader and the other one a quality follower. In
order to introduce a dynamic trade-off between innovation and preference advantages for
firms, this first block of the model is plugged into a quality ladder version of the Aghion et
al. (2005) framework. It allows us to endogenize the relationships between competition,
advertising and R&D decisions.
Our model provides two main predictions and a conditional prediction. First, for a
given competitive environment, quality leaders spend more in advertising than Neck and
Neck firms or quality followers; they extract maximal rents from their twofold monopo-
list positions (in preferences and in quality). There is thus a dynamic complementarity
between current advertising and past R&D efforts that stochastically determines the in-
novation position of the firms. Second, more competition pushes Neck and Neck firms
to advertise more in order to attract the larger share of consumers on their products or
services. More generally, endogenizing the state of a sector leveled versus unleveled yields
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a positive monotonic relationship between competition toughness and advertising expen-
ditures when cost of ads is moderate. Third, in this case, a lower cost of advertising may
stimulate R&D.
Using a large unbalanced panel of around 59,000 French firms over the 1990-2004 pe-
riod, we test most of these assertions. The Centrale des Bilans database from the Banque
de France provides very detailed data on firm performance and firm expenditures or in-
vestments including R&D and advertising. Within sectors, most productive firms seem to
spend more in advertising. Similarly, current advertising spending is positively correlated
to past R&D efforts. These results are consistent with a dynamic complementarity between
R&D and advertising. Estimations also support the monotonic impact of competition on
advertising.
This article is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the basic theoretical static
framework. Section 3 introduces the dynamic R&D process and studies the impact of
advertising costs on the flows of innovation. Our main predictions are then derived ana-
lytically from this model. Section 4 provides a description of the data and presents our
main empirical findings. Section 5 concludes with directions for further research.
2 Advertising and competition without R&D dynamics
This section presents a static theoretical framework to capture the basic connections
between competition and advertising for a given technological level of firms. The dynamic
interaction with R&D will be dealt with in section 3.
2.1 Basic market structure and quality
We consider markets as duopolies with firms A and B producing differentiated goods
or services. The market can be in a Neck and Neck situation where there is no quality
gap between A and B or in an unleveled situation where a quality leader (say A) and a
follower (say B) coexist.
To structure the discussion, we introduce hedonic indexes of quantities. Hedonic in-
dexes -volume and price- adjust for quality (J. Triplett, 2004). For example, a two-
megahertz chipset will be considered equivalent to two one-megahertz chipsets: the hedo-
nic factor is thus 2. Let x and xˆ denote respectively the volume and the hedonic volume;
let p and pˆ be respectively the price and the hedonic price.
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In the leader-follower case, the leader enjoys a quality gap for similar production costs
c: it produces goods with a better quality with a given hedonic factor 1 + . We assume
that  is small, so we will work, from herein, with first order terms in .
Without loss of generality, in the Neck and Neck case, we take the normalization
xA = xˆA, xB = xˆB, pA = pˆA and pB = pˆB. Then, in the leader-follower case, if for
example A is the leader: xˆA = xA(1 + ), xB = xˆB, pˆA = pA/(1 + ) and pB = pˆB. Note
that we have always px = pˆxˆ.
2.2 Consumers
We assume that  also represents the ex ante valuation advantage firms have on spe-
cific consumers. These consumers have an initial preference for the goods from A or B.
Examples include the wine vs. beer US market of alcohol: recent Gallup polls show that
upper-class male Americans that are above 45 and very fond of European culture give
a prominent place to wine whereas less well-to-do and younger drinkers favor beer. In-
between these two categories, people may be classified as indifferent. Segmentation of
consumers can also come from geographic constraints, e.g. customers prefer to buy in
stores located in their neighborhood. Similarly, artistic professions favor Mac computers
whereas scientific professions are more inclined to buy PC, with a priori neutral users in
between. We formalize this ex ante inclination of consumers by the existence of segments
of captive consumers. The size of these segments is inversely proportional to the degree of
competition. To escape competition on the non captive segments, firms can advertise to
attract a share of the initially neutral consumers, but also some consumers that ex ante
prefer the other good.
Formally, consider a continuum of consumers of mass one indexed by i. Their utility
follows:
ui =
∫ 1
0
lnxijdj
where xij is the aggregate of two perfect substitutes A and B from two firms on the market
j defined by :
xij = (1 + )kij/2xˆAj + (1 + )−kij/2xˆBj
where kij takes value in {−1, 0, 1}. We assume that firms can discriminate consumers
according to their ex post preferences.
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2.2.1 Without advertising
On each market, without loss of generality, consumers can be aligned on the segment
[0,1] by increasing order of preference for good B. Because there is no advertising, ex post
preferences are the ex ante preferences. The fraction fj ∈ [0, 1/2] of non indifferent con-
sumers is defined such as:
kij =

1 if i ∈ IA = [0, fj ]
0 if i ∈ I0 =]fj , 1− fj [
−1 if i ∈ IB = [1− fj , 1]
Figure 1 provides an illustration of the distribution of preferences.
The log-preference assumption made in the first equation implies that individuals spend
the same amount on each basket xj . We normalize this common amount to unity by
using expenditure as numeraire for the prices pAj and pBj at each date. Thus each
consumer i chooses xˆAj and xˆBj to maximise xij subject to the budget constraint :
pAjxAj + pBjxBj = pˆAj xˆAj + pˆBj xˆBj = 1. The demand function facing firm A is then:
pˆAj xˆAj =

1 if pˆAj/pˆBj < (1 + )kij
1/2 if pˆAj/pˆBj = (1 + )kij
0 if pˆAj/pˆBj > (1 + )kij
The demand function facing firm B is trivially obtained by inverting A and B in the
expression above.
Figure 1: Initial distribution of consumers valuation advantage, kij , given to good A
We drop the j subscript in the remaining of the text.
2.2.2 With advertising
Assume now that firms are given the opportunity to advertise their product. Adver-
tising is viewed as a mean of modifying consumers’ preferences by affecting their marginal
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Figure 2: Advertising and consumers valuation advantage, kij , given to good A
rate of substitution; i.e. ads are persuasive and informative. We model advertising1 ac-
cording to the following stylized assumptions:
H1a: If a consumer receives ads from only one firm, her preferences are biased in favor
of the product of this firm.
H1b: If a consumer receives ads from the two firms, she comes back to her ex ante
preferences.
H2a: Each firm chooses a certain probability qA (resp qB) to reach a consumer by
advertising. Firms cannot target their ads; This is consistent with the fact that advertising
expenditures are primarily in general media (Bagwell, 2005).
H2b: Each firm incurs a cost proportional to q, say φq for advertising, with /2 < φ < .
Recall that  is small, so we work with first order terms in . Consequently: (1 + )2 =
1 + 2, 1/(1 + ) = 1 −  and 1/(1 + )2 = 1 − 2. Chart 2 sums up the marginal rate of
substitution (MRS) in two polar cases.
2.3 Firms: equilibrium prices and profits
2.3.1 Without advertising
Firms use labor as the only input, according to a constant-return production function,
and take the wage rate as given. The cost of producing one unit of non-hedonic quantity
of good is the same for both firms and is denoted c. This unit cost of production c of the
two firms in an industry is independent of the quantities produced.
Firms are supposed to be able to price discriminate consumers according to their ex post
preferences. They may use for example price promotion for new clients or fidelity cards.
Duopolies compete in prices for each consumer, arriving at a Bertrand equilibrium. We
now derive the explicit form of prices and profits depending on the technology configuration
of the market.
1For alternative models of advertising in a duopoly framework, see Schoonbeek et al (2007) or Piga
(2000).
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Throughout the text, subscript 1 will refer to the leader, subscript -1 to the follower,
whereas subscript 0 refers to Neck and Neck firms.
a) leveled sector
In this case, firms are Neck and Neck and production costs are equal for similar quality.
On I0, due to Bertrand competition, firms will trivially set their price equal to their cost
c and make no profit. On IA, firm A will use its comparative advantage and choose the
maximum price such as firm B cannot steal the market IA from A without making a
negative profit. That is, pA,IA = c× (1 + ). Firm B acts on IB as A on IA and gets this
market. The infinitesimal profit made on each i ∈ [0, 1] is ΠA,i = pA,ixA,i − cxA,i. Given
that pA,ixA,i = 1, ΠA,i = 1− cpA,i if i chooses to buy firm A’s good. Finally, since we work
with first order terms in , the overall profit flow of firms A and B in the neck and neck
case is:
Π0 = f(1− 11 + ) = f
b) unleveled sector
In this second case, one of the two firms is leader and has a hedonic quality advantage
equal to 1 + . Without loss of generality, we assume that when the sector is unleveled,
firm A is the leader and firm B the follower. Again, on each segment, firm A will use its
comparative advantage and choose the maximum price such as firm B cannot steal the
market without making a negative profit. On IA, firm A cumulates its quality advantage
and the consumers’ preference advantage. Hence, firm A prices pˆA,IA = c(1 + ) i.e.
pA,IA = c(1 + 2). Similarly, pA,I0 = c(1 + ) and pA,IB = c. Firm A gets the segments
IA and I0 and share with firm B the segment IB (since the MRS is equal to the ratio of
prices) and do not make any profit on this segment. The follower total profit Π−1 is equal
to 0 and, since we work with first order terms in , the leader’s total profit is:
Π1 = f(1− 11 + 2) + (1− 2f)(1−
1
1 + 
) = 2f+ (1− 2f) = 
2.3.2 With advertising
The equilibrium prices and profits depend on the amount of advertising realized by
each firm which is function of the cost of advertising φ. We have again to separate the two
states of the sector. This framework covers two main views of advertising. In an unleveled
sector, ads help the leader to provide information to neutral consumers and thus to expand
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its profitable market share. In a leveled sector, both firms use ads to challenge the market
positions.
a) leveled sector
Firms A and B are Neck and Neck. They choose their probability qA and qB to reach
a consumer. Their game is formally similar to a mixed-strategy game with q = 0 and
q = 1 the pure strategies. So, their choices are also the mixed Nash equilibrium of this
latter game. On its ex ante captive segment, firm A can sell above its marginal cost
only to consumers that have not received an ad from B or that have received ads from
both firms. Its sales profits are then f(1 − qB + qBqA). Similarly, profits of A on the
central segment are (1 − 2f)(qA − qBqA) and on the B captive segment f(qA − qBqA).
The profits of A are then piA = [(1 − f)qA − (1 − 2f)qAqB + f(1 − qB)] − φqA. Assume
that A chooses a mixed strategy; the support of this strategy is qA = 0 and qA = 1.
Consequently the Nash mixed strategy for B is qB such that (piA|qA = 0) = (piA|qA = 1)
i.e. f(1− qB) = f + (1− 2f)(1− qB) + f(1− qB)−φ/, or (1− f)− (1− 2f)qB −φ/ = 0.
Therefore, we have to distinguish 2 cases:
- if /2 < φ < (1− f), then the Nash equilibrium is the symmetric strategy:
q0 = qA = qB =
1− f − φ/
1− 2f ∈ [0, 1]
- if (1− f) < φ < , then the Nash equilibrium is the symmetric strategy:
q0 = qA = qB = 0
b) unleveled sector
We first prove that the follower has no interest to advertise. Assume that the follower
makes some ads q > 0. By construction, its ads are more efficient when the leader does
not advertise2 . Take this case: the follower convinces a share q of consumer; however,
the follower has to adjust its hedonic price to a level for which the technological leader
makes no profits i.e. c; so the follower makes also no sales profits and incurs a cost
φq > 0 for advertising. So even in the most favorable case for the follower, the profits
of the follower are negative when q is positive. Consequently, the follower advertising
probability is q−1 = 0 and its profit is Π−1 = 0.
Now consider the leader. It chooses a level of advertising q in order to maximize its
profits. The leader’s net revenue is 2f on its ex ante captive segment; (1−2f)(2q+(1−q))
2since pi−1(q1, q−1) ≤ pi−1(0, q−1) ≤ 0; let us note that: pi−1(0, 0) = 0 and pi−1(0, q−1) = −q−1φ
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on the ex ante neutral segment; and 2fq on the ex ante captive segment of the follower.
This implies:
Π1(q) = 2f+ 2(1− 2f)q + (1− 2f)(1− q) + f(1− q)− φq = + q(− φ).
Now because  > φ, the leader maximizes its profits when q = q1 = 1 i.e. Π1 = 2− φ.
Table 1 summarizes these results and figure 3 depicts the leader’s and Neck and Neck’s
advertising levels when f varies between 0 and 1/2 and φ = 0.6. Note that Π0 being equal
to f or to the product of two positive functions that are increasing with f is increasing
with f.
Table 1: Firms advertising expenditure and profit
Follower Leader Neck&Neck
Without ads: Π−1 = 0 Π1 =  Π0 = f
With Ads:
q−1 = 0 q1 = 1
- if /2 < φ < (1− f):
q0 = (1− f − φ/)/(1− 2f)
Π0 = f(
φ/−f
1−2f )
Π−1 = 0 Π1 = 2− φ
- if (1− f) < φ < :
q0 = 0
Π0 = f
Figure 3: Leader’s and Neck and neck’s advertising probabilities and profits as a function
of competition (φ = 0.6):
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We have thus the following proposition that is consistent with Milgrom and Roberts
(1986) findings:
Proposition 1: Advertising expenditures increase with the quality advantage of firms:
the quality leader advertises more than the follower and the Neck and Neck; and the Neck
and Neck advertises more than the follower.
Intuitively, because it faces lower production costs, the quality leader has interest to
try to capture both ex ante neutral and unfavorable segments. In addition it does not
face the advertising competition of its competitor. So it advertises more than Neck and
Neck firms for a given level of competition f . Neck and Neck firms advertise more than
followers who do no advertise since they lose money if they do. This leads to results again
consistent with the literature (see Bagwell 2005):
Proposition 2: For a given state of the sector (leveled or unleveled) advertising expen-
ditures are increasing with competition. More precisely, q0 is decreasing with f and q−1
and q1 are constant.
Intuitively, when competition is tougher i.e. the ex-ante non-captive markets are large,
all firms try to escape competition through an increase in their advertising effort.
Now, computing the aggregated levels of advertising for different degrees of competition
and so to determine the relation between advertising and competition requires to determine
the proportion of leveled and unleveled sectors for a given degree of competition.
3 Dynamics of R&D investment and advertising
Firms can develop a dynamic strategy to escape competition through becoming a
quality leader and thus through innovation. Hence, we have to introduce the dynamics
of R&D investment. The benchmark case of Aghion et al. (2005) framework naturally
generates unleveled and Neck and Neck sectors. We develop here a quality ladder version
of this framework and plug in this environment the static model of section 2.
We assume the main subcase of Aghion et al. (2005): knowledge spill-overs between
leader and follower are such that the maximum sustainable quality gap is 1, leading to a
maximal hedonic advantage equal to 1 + . If a firm is one step ahead and it innovates
the follower will automatically copy the leader’s previous technology and so remain only
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one step behind.
The state of an industry is then fully characterized by a pair of integers (l,m) where l
is the leader’s technology and m = 1 is the technology gap of the leader over the follower;
m = 0 when firms are neck and neck. As proved in the previous section, the profit in the
industry depends only on the gap m between the two firms and not on absolute levels of
technology.
The R&D cost of firm moving one quality step ahead with a Poisson hazard rate of n
is n2/2. We call n the ”innovation rate” or ”R&D intensity” of the firm. We assume that
a follower firm can move one step ahead with hazard rate h even if it spends nothing on
R&D, by copying the leader’s technology. Thus n2/2 is the R&D cost of a follower firm
moving ahead with a hazard rate n + h. Each innovation step changes the competitive
environment and thus cancels the effect of past advertising on consumers’ preferences.
3.1 Bellman equations
We now derive general equations for R&D investments. Let V denote the steady state
value of the firm. We have the following Bellman equations:
rV1 = Π1 + (n−1 + h)(V0 − V1)− n21/2
rV−1 = Π−1 + (n−1 + h)(V0 − V−1)− n2−1/2
rV0 = Π0 + n0(V1 − V0) + n¯0(V−1 − V0)− n20/2
(1)
The annuity value rV1 of currently being a quality leader in an industry with gap 1 at date
t equals the current profit flow Π1 minus the current R&D cost n21/2, plus the expected
capital loss (n−1 + h)(V0 − V1) from having the follower catch up with the leader. Similar
arguments lead to equations for the value of a follower and a neck and neck firm.
Given that profitability is only dependent on the gap between leader and follower, no
innovation will be undertaken by the leader i.e. n1 = 0. Now, using the fact that each
firm chooses its own R&D intensity to maximize its current value, i.e. to maximize the
RHS of the corresponding equation, we obtain the first order conditions:
n−1 = V0 − V−1
n0 = V1 − V0
n1 = 0
(2)
According to these first order conditions, an increase in market competition diminishes
profits of a leveled firm, and consequently its market value V0 decreases. Hence, one could
13
expect that an increase in market competition leads to an increase in n0 and a decline in
n−1.
Equations (1) and (2) solve for n0 and n−1. Eliminating the V ’s between these equa-
tions yields the reduced form R&D equations:
n20
2
+ (r + h)n0 − (Π1 −Π0) = 0
n2−1
2
+ (r + h+ n0)n−1 − (Π0 −Π−1)− n
2
0
2
= 0
This system is recursive, as the first equation solves for n0, and then given n0 the second
equation solves for n−1.We obtain:
n0 = −r − h+
√
(r + h)2 + 2(Π1 −Π0) (3)
n−1 = −(r + h+ n0) +
√
(r + h+ n0)2 + n20 + 2(Π0 −Π−1) (4)
Using equation (3) to substitute (r + h + n0)2 in equation (4) yields the alternative ex-
pression:
n−1 = −(r + h+ n0) +
√
(r + h)2 + n20 + 2(Π1 −Π−1) (5)
The R&D investment n0 of a Neck and Neck firm is increasing in (Π1 − Π0): the
larger the difference between Neck and Neck firms and leader firms profit flows, the larger
the incentive for a Neck and Neck firm to become a leader and thus the larger its R&D
investment. Interpretation of equation 4 is also intuitive: for n0 given, n−1 is increasing
in (Π0 − Π−1); the larger its incentive to catch-up the leader, the greater the follower’s
R&D investment. But it requires two successful investments for the follower to become a
leader, and its profit in the intermediate situation of Neck and Neck should also matters.
This is captured by the presence of n0 in equation (5): n−1 is decreasing3 in n0.
The innovation rate of a sector is 2n0 if the sector is leveled and n−1 if the sector is
unleveled. But the average innovation rate of a sector in steady state also depends on the
fraction of time a sector spends being leveled or unleveled. Formally, let µ1 (resp. µ0)
denote the steady state probability of being an unleveled (resp. neck and neck) industry.
During any unit time interval, the steady state probability that a sector moves from being
unleveled to leveled is µ1(n−1 + h), and the probability that it moves in the opposite
direction is 2µ0 × n0. In steady state, these two probabilities must be equal:
µ1(n−1 + h) = 2µ0n0
3Indeed ∂n−1/∂n0 = −1 + n0/
√
(r + h)2 + n20 + 2(Π1 −Π−1) < 0.
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Because µ1 + µ0 = 1, this implies that the average flow of innovation is:
I = µ02n0 + µ1n−1 = µ1(2n−1 + h) =
4n0n−1 + 2n0h
2n0 + n−1 + h
(6)
3.2 Competition and advertising
As in Aghion et al. (2005), the general form of I is an inverted-U shape according to
the level of competition. The escape competition effect dominates when competition is
not too harsh.
Profit flows of firms A and B calculated in section 2 depend on the degree of compe-
tition, the ratio of valuation for goods A and B for a consumer in [0, f ], the quality gap
and the cost of advertising φ. As a consequence, I is a function of exogenous parameters
f , , r and h.
Figure 4 plots the average of innovation and advertising expenditure when r = 0.05,
h = 0.20,  = 0.05, and the cost of advertising is moderate (φ = 4/5 = 0.04).
Innovation appears to be indeed inverted U-shaped and the right side plot exhibits a
positive relation between competition and advertising effort. In addition, competition and
advertising spending are positively related when the cost of advertising is moderate:
Proposition 3: In the dynamic framework, average advertising expendituresA = φ(µ02q0+
µ1q1) are still increasing with competition.
Proposition 3 is proved in appendix 1.
Remark: Through changes in competition, we may observe a negative relation between
innovation flows and advertising efforts. Figure 4 illustrates that when the competitive
environment is harsh (f small), a firm facing even more competition reduces current R&D
but increases current advertising. However, this mechanism driven by competition does
not mean that advertising and R&D are substitute. Actually, the static results still hold:
for a given competitive environment, innovative firms advertise more and firms innovate
more when advertising is possible.
3.3 Advertising costs and R&D
Because of the interplay between R&D and advertising, changes in the advertising
regulation or technologies may alter advertising costs and thus R&D. For example, Internet
has opened a new facility for advertising. On the contrary, some countries heavily regulate
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Figure 4: Competition and average sectoral advertising effort and flow of innovation:
simulation results.
Advertising Effort Flow of Innovation
Note: Competition is a decreasing function of the proportion of captive consumers f on the x-axis.
ads in certain media; that is the case in France where the government has recently banished
ads on all public TV after 8 pm.
Now, reducing the cost of advertising has the direct effect to stimulate advertising
expenditures. But how this additional advertising does affect the firms’ R&D efforts? This
crucially depends on the relative effect of decreasing advertising costs on the follower, Neck
and Neck and leader expected profits. However, we prove (see appendix) the following
partial result:
Proposition 4: The total flow of innovation is decreasing with φ if competition is not
too harsh.
In other words, the less expensive advertising is, the more R&D. This is true for any
degree of competition, that is for any given value of f between 1−φ/ and 1. Simulations
(see figure 6 in appendix 2) show how I varies when f and φ vary: I is inverted U shape as
a function of f (on the x axis) and increases a lot when the cost of advertising is decreased
from φ =  = 0.05 to φ = /2 = 0.025 (y axis).
4 Empirical evidence
This section exploits French micro datasets in order to test the main theoretical pre-
dictions. The originality of the data is to provide both R&D investment and advertising
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spending for a large panel of firms. Raw statistics are consistent with the model. Figure
5 plots the average of R&D and advertising efforts as a function of the 20-ciles of firm
Lerners. R&D effort appears inverted U-shaped in the measure of competition whereas
average advertising is clearly increasing with competition.
Figure 5: Competition and advertising and R&D expenditures: evidence for a panel of
French firms.
Note: Competition is a decreasing function of the Lerner index on the x-axis.
Source: FIBEN/Centrale des Bilans
We now turn to the presentation of the data sources and then to the econometric
estimations.
4.1 Data
We use a subset of the FIBEN dataset provided by the Observatoire des entreprises
at the Banque de France. Data from FIBEN are collected on a voluntary basis. Clerks in
the different local establishments of the Bank of France contact firm to complete a survey.
The Fiben database is based on firms tax forms and includes all businesses with more
than 500 employees and a fraction of smaller firms. It covers about 57% of employment
for manufacturing but less for service sectors. A subset of FIBEN, the so called Centrale
des Bilans contains more detailed information on firms’ expenditures that are specifically
devoted to increase their potential sales, with two special items on advertising and R&D
expenditures4.
4These items have a precise counterpart in the official accounting plan ( plan comptable ge´ne´ral).
Advertising comes from category 623, whereas R&D expenditures are the sum of elements in categories
61, 62 and 64.
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The clear value-added of these micro data compared to other sources on R&D is to
include firms that have episodic R&D and advertising activities or novel firms and to
provide in the same time their advertising efforts. R&D can be considered either as
expenditure or as investment in the French legal accounting setting. Broadly speaking,
R&D costs concerning a well defined project and yielding almost certain return can be
declared as investments whereas R&D expenditures linked to more uncertain projects
have to be considered as current expenditures. In this paper, we add these two categories
together.
Advertising expenditures in our data is a broad category: it includes the classic ads
in various media but also expenditures for exhibits, the publication of catalogs and the
organization of public events as well as expenditures due to presents and free samples
offered to customers.
A Lerner index for each firm can be built using these data. We only observe sectoral
price provided by the INSEE, but we have detailed information on costs. The Lerner
index is supposed to measure the market power of the firm by the difference between
price and marginal costs (which equals the negative inverse of demand elasticity). Since
neither price nor marginal costs are available at the firm level, we compute the index
using value-added net of depreciation and provisions minus the financial cost of capital
(cost of capital*capital stock) over sales (in line with Aghion et al., 2005). The Fiben
database contains very detailed balance sheet information that enables to compute these
Lerner indicators.5 In our model the Lerner index is decreasing with f , the measure of
competition.
Using measures of capital stocks in volume that account for differences in the average
age of capital6, we compute a total factor productivity index (TFP) for each firm based
on a revenue function. TFP is computed as the ratio of value added over a Cobb-Douglas
combination of labor and capital, where the parameter for labor is firm specific, taken as
the time average of the share of the wage bill in value added and the parameter of the
capital stock equals one minus the parameter of labor. Note that in our model, all firms
5Lerner=(value added-depreciation-cost of capital.capital stock-provision)/sales
Using the standard mnemonics of French tax forms: Lerner=[VA-(AQ+AS+AU+AW+AY- AQ-1-AS-1-
AU-1-AW-1-AY-1)-0.085.capital-(DR-DR-1)]/FL.
6FIBEN includes balance sheet data only; namely, the value of physical assets that it reports is given
at historical costs. Using standard methods based on the depreciation rate, we estimate the average age
of capital to adjust for this price effect.
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have the same technology (same c) but the leader (say firm A) can set higher prices than
Neck and Neck firms on IB and I0 due to hedonic advantage. Hence, on average, leaders
enjoy higher TFP, based on a revenue function than Neck and Neck firms.
We finally have Lerner index, total R&D and marketing expenditures available for an
unbalanced panel of 59 thousands firms from 1990 to 2004. This final sample contains
around 480,000 firm-year observations, the number of firms present each year is around
30,000 and is relatively stable over time. In average a firm is observed in our sample during
around 7 years.
Table 2 shows some aggregate descriptive statistics. On average advertising weights
about 4.1% of firm value-added and R&D spending about 1.6%. This last figure is con-
sistent with the national account ratio for market economy.
Table 2: Descriptive statistics for main variables
Mean Median Std. Dev. First Last Number
decile decile of obs
Value added (1000’e ) 6155.4 1296 93135.7 359 7623 515,185
Advertising exp. (1000’e ) 253.6 3.047691 4758.0 0 117 515,185
Advertising exp. (e ) per empl. 1430.0 102.8 6141.2 0 3000.1 515,185
R&D exp. (1000’e ) 97.1 0 4313.1 0 3.2 515,185
R&D exp. (e ) per employee 226.6 0 1595.2 0 63.6 515,185
Total factor productivity .21 0.19 .1108 .092 .33 436945
Nb of employees 123 33 1542 9 172 515185
R&D stock (e ) per employee 943 0 9162 0 832 329235
Lerner index 0.29 0.28 0.16 0.10 0.50 471,503
Value added, advertising expenditure and R&D expenditure are given in thousands of 2004 euros.
Advertising and R&D expenditure per employee and R&D stock per employee are given in 2004
euros.
Table 6 in appendix 2 presents the mean of advertising and R&D by sector. Unsur-
prisingly, retail trade, food industry and consumer goods exhibit high levels of advertising
(more than 2000 Euros per employee); whereas high level of R&D are observed in cars,
equipment goods and energy sectors. One manufacturing sector has a very high level of
advertising compared to R&D: food industry, which partly reflects the downstream margin
effects.
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4.2 Results
Two key predictions of the model can be statistically tested. First, our model shows
that there is an increasing relationship between advertising and competition. Second, the
quality leader always has a level of advertising that is higher than the rest of the firms.
Three types of estimations are applied on the panel data: a simple OLS, a firm fixed
effect estimator and a random effect estimation. 114 industry dummies, firm size and year
fixed effects have been included as controls in all specifications. All standard errors are
computed using the standard Huber-White sandwich procedure.
Table 2 tests the first prediction. Two alternative specifications are used: The measure
of the inverse of competition is either a firm-level Lerner or a industry-level Lerner. To cope
with simultaneity issue, the firm-level index is lagged. Advertising effort is measured as the
ratio of advertising in 2004 Euros over the number of employees in the firm. Controlling
for years and for firm size, the regression coefficient between advertising and the inverse of
competition is clearly negative. Note that these results are not driven by large firms since
they still hold when restricting the sample to firms below 250 employees. The magnitudes
of the estimated coefficients are similar for the 3 alternative estimators. An increase of one
standard deviation of the Lerner index is associated with significant additional advertising
expenditures: about 500 euros per employee.
Tables 3 and 4 test the second prediction. In order to identify potential leaders, we
first make the reasonable assumption that leaders enjoy a better total factor productiv-
ity (TFP). For the OLS estimations, a leader should be considered as the leader in its
industry for a given date, so we add detailed industries*date dummies as references in
the regressions. Table 3 shows that higher TFP (coincident or lagged) is correlated with
higher advertising. Here again the estimated coefficient is large; a 10% rise in TFP is
associated with an increase in advertising expenditure ranging from 250 to 420 euros per
employee.
Assuming that the technological position can also be described by cumulative past
R&D efforts, we build a rough proxy for a R&D stock by adding R&D expenditures over
the past 4 years. The average R&D stock is around 950 Euros per employee. Table 4
shows that higher lagged R&D stock per employee is correlated with higher advertising.
Unsurprisingly, the relationship between current R&D stock and advertising is much more
blurred, since this former includes current R&D expenditures which should equal 0 for the
quality leader according to the model.
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Table 3: Advertising and competition. 1990-2004.
Dependent variable: advertising expenditure (in thousands 2004 euros) per employee
1:OLS 2:FE 3:RE 4:OLS 5:FE 6:RE
Lerner industry 114 (lagged) -3.719 -2.341 -5.700
(4.30)** (4.89)** (28.56)**
Lerner firm (lagged) -3.006 -1.431 -2.832
(39.77)** (12.31)** (31.29)**
Nb of employees (thousands) 0.059 -0.024 0.013 0.097 -0.083 0.046
(8.92)** (2.72)** (2.26)* (11.39)** (1.16) (3.71)**
Constant 3.361 2.952 3.989 3.116 2.683 3.106
(13.05)** (20.38)** (48.10)** (71.28)** (56.82)** (56.25)**
Years YES YES YES YES YES YES
114 industry dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 476418 476418 476418 470128 471503 471503
Number of firms 59554 59554 59554 59554 59073 59073
R-squared 0.07 0.02 0.07 0.02
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%, robust t and z statistics in parentheses.
Table 4: Advertising and technological position. 1990-2004.
Dependent variable: advertising expenditure (in thousands 2004 euros) per employee
1:OLS 2:FE 3:RE 4:OLS 5:FE 6:RE
TFP 4.244 2.932 2.765
(44.66)** (10.47)** (11.65)**
TFP (lagged) 4.097 2.827 2.594
(38.90)** (9.07)** (10.11)**
Nb of employees (thousands) 0.060 -0.021 0.008 0.061 -0.021 0.010
(8.66)** (3.63)** (1.60) (8.27)** (3.42)** (1.84)
Constant 0.609 1.595 1.633 0.703 0.182 1.660
(28.11)** (24.10)** (26.21)** (29.48)** (2.61)** (25.70)**
(industry114, year) dummies Yes No No Yes No No
Year No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 436945 436945 436945 378809 378809 378809
Number of firms 52885 52885 52885 49818 49818 49818
R-squared 0.08 0.02 0.09 0.02
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%, robust t and z statistics in parentheses.
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Table 5: Advertising and gross R&D stock. 1990-2004.
Dependent variable: advertising expenditure (in thousands 2004 euros) per employee
1:OLS 2:FE 3:RE 4:OLS 5:FE 6:RE
R&D stock per employee 0.037 0.006 0.011
(29.39)** (0.75) (1.52)
R&D stock per employee (-1) 0.034 0.023 0.018
(23.68)** (2.76)** (1.89)
Nb of employees (thousands) 0.058 -0.013 0.016 0.058 -0.014 0.015
(7.21)** (1.83) (2.37)* (6.79)** (1.49) (2.16)*
Constant 1.566 0.811 0.871 1.677 0.788 0.838
(0.00) (25.30)** (23.87)** (134.86)** (23.41)** (22.20)**
(industry114, year) dummies Yes No No Yes No No
Year No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 329235 329235 329235 277790 277790 277790
Number of firms 48705 48705 48705 43461 43461 43461
R-squared 0.08 0.02 0.09 0.02
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%, robust t and z statistics in parentheses.
These findings seem to clearly support a complementarity between advertising efforts
and the past innovation efforts of firm or their current technological level, in line with the
prediction of our model.
Note that the model has no clear prediction on the relation between current R&D
and current advertising expenditures. The leader does not spend on R&D and strongly
advertise whereas followers and Neck and Neck firms spend on R&D but advertise less
strongly. This suggests a negative relation. But the R&D expenditures of the followers
and Neck and Neck crucially depend on the degree of competition, which makes the
overall relation theoretically unclear. Our data are not inconsistent with the latter: the
empirical correlation between current R&D and current advertising efforts is negative but
non robust.
5 Conclusion
We have studied the interactions between competition, R&D and advertising through
a static and a dynamic frameworks. Empirical evidence using a large dataset on French
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firms supports the two main predictions of our theoretical model: First, advertising efforts
are increasing with competition. Second, qualitative leaders spend more on advertising;
intuitively, leaders enjoy higher advertising returns by capturing the segment of neutral
consumers and those who ex ante prefer the follower products. This last result suggests
that the lower the cost of advertising the higher the incentive of becoming a leader. As
a consequence, reduced advertising cost may improve innovation. An extension of this
paper will be to investigate such a mechanism. Empirically, this would require identifying
structural reforms impacting advertising costs or technological shocks. The emergence of
massive advertising on internet would offer a relevant natural experiment when data will
be available.
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Appendix 1: Proof of propositions 3 and 4
Proof of proposition 3: According to section 2, the advertising effort of the leader q1 = 1
is at least twice the advertising effort of a Neck and Neck firm; indeed, if φ > (1 − f),
q0 = 0 and if φ < (1 − f), q0 = 1−f−φ/1−2f ≤ 1/2−f1−2f = 0.5 (since φ > /2). Both q1
and q0 are non-increasing with f , so non-decreasing with competition. Therefore, as
A = φ(µ02q0 + µ1q1) = 2q0 + µ1(q1 − 2q0), proposition 3 is straightforward if the proba-
bility of being unleveled µ1 is increasing with competition.
As shown in table 1, Π0 is always increasing with f when φ ∈ [/2, ], and then Π1−Π0
is decreasing with f since Π1 does not vary with f. Therefore according to equation 3,
n0 is increasing with competition (escape competition effect). In addition, as previously
noted, n−1 is a decreasing function of n0, while Π1 − Π−1 = 2− φ is constant. So, from
equation 5, n−1 is decreasing with competition and the ratio (n−1 + h)/n0 is decreasing
with competition.
But µ1(n−1+h) = 2µ0n0 and µ0+µ1 = 1. Thus µ1 = 22+(n−1+h)/n0 is indeed increasing
with competition. QED
Proof of proposition 4: The proof proceeds in 4 steps:
1) If the R&D efforts n0 and n1 are both decreasing with φ, then the total flow of
innovation I is also decreasing with φ.
2) n0 is decreasing with φ.
3) ∂n0∂φ and
∂n−1
∂φ have the same sign as soon as n0 > n−1.
4) n0(f = 1/2) > n−1(f = 1/2) and n0 is decreasing with f whereas n−1 is increasing
with f . Thus n0 > n−1 for all f ∈ [0, 1/2].
1), 2), 3) and 4) clearly imply that I is decreasing with φ, that is, reducing the cost of
advertising increases the R&D effort.
Proof of 1): ∂I∂φ and
∂ln(I)
∂φ have the same sign. Let n
′
0 and n
′−1 denote respectively
∂n0
∂φ
and ∂n−1∂φ and assume they are negative. From equation 6, we get:
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∂ln(I)
∂φ
=
n′0
n0
+
2n′−1
2n−1 + h
− 2n
′
0 + n
′−1
2n0 + n−1 + h
≤ 2n
′
0
2n0 + n−1 + h
+
n′−1
n−1 + h+ 2n0
− 2n
′
0 + n
′−1
2n0 + n−1 + h
≤ 0
Proof of 2):
For values of φ between /2 and , Π1 is decreasing with φ whereas Π0 is increasing or
constant with φ. This implies that Π1 − Π0 is decreasing with φ. From equation 3, n0 is
decreasing with φ.
Proof of 3):
Differentiating equation 2 with respect to φ gives:
n−1n′−1 + (r + h+ n0)n′−1 + n−1n′0 − n0n′0 = 0
n′−1 = n′0(
n0−n−1
n−1+n0+r+h) if f > 1−
φ

Proof of 4):
The fact that n0 is decreasing with f and n−1 increasing with f are prooven in the proof
of proposition 3. When f = 1/2, q0 = 0 and Π0 = f = /2 whereas Π1 = 2− φ remain
independent of f . Π1 −Π0 = 3/2− φ. Π1 −Π−1 = 2− φ.
Substracting equation 5 to equation 3 we get:
n0 − n−1 > 0 ⇔ n0 +
√
(r + h)2 + 3− 2φ ≥
√
(r + h)2 + n20 + 4− 2φ
⇔ n20 + (r + h)2 + 3− 2φ+ 2n0
√
(r + h)2 + 3− 2φ ≥ (r + h)2 + n20 + 4− 2φ
⇔ 2n0
√
(r + h)2 + 3− 2φ ≥ 
⇔
(
−(r + h) +
√
(r + h)2 + 3− 2φ
)√
(r + h)2 + 3− 2φ ≥ /2
⇔ −(r + h)
√
(r + h)2 + 3− 2φ+ (r + h)2 + 5/2− 2φ ≥ 0
⇔ ((r + h)2 + 5/2− 2φ)2 ≥ (r + h)2 ((r + h)2 + 3− 2φ)
⇔ (5− 4φ)(r + h)2 + (5/2− 2φ)2 ≥ (r + h)2(3− 2φ)
⇔ 2(− φ)(r + h)2 + (5/2− 2φ)2 ≥ 0
which is true since φ ≤ . QED.
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Appendix 2: Results from simulations and Descriptive statistics
Figure 6: Average sectoral flow of innovation when the degree of competition (x axis) and
the cost of advertising (y axis) vary
28
Table 6: Sectoral mean of main variables (2004 euros)
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Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 0.912 0.017 0.354 0.005 17.560 0.294
Food and agricultural manufacturing 4.610 0.075 0.165 0.003 100.756 0.197
Consumer goods manufacturing 2.073 0.034 0.347 0.006 25.037 0.358
Car manufacturing 0.726 0.014 0.591 0.012 5.915 0.287
Equipment good manufacturing 0.679 0.014 0.741 0.014 5.272 0.370
Intermediary good manufacturing 0.561 0.011 0.233 0.004 9.331 0.327
Energy 2.306 0.023 0.829 0.008 9.917 0.242
Construction 0.346 0.007 0.030 0.001 5.694 0.391
Gross and retail trade 2.294 0.044 0.086 0.001 33.085 0.167
Transport 0.431 0.009 0.028 0.000 14.576 0.348
Real estate 1.828 0.025 0.065 0.001 72.593 0.345
Business sectors 0.854 0.012 0.528 0.008 6.876 0.500
Services 1.067 0.020 0.049 0.001 13.701 0.396
Number of observations 480194 480194 480194 480194 56863 470128
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